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Abstract
Appeals to the actual author's intention in order to legitimate
an interpretation of a work of literary narrative fiction have
generally been considered extraneous in Anglo-American
philosophy of literature since Wimsatt and Beardsley's well-
known manifesto from the 1940s. For over sixty years now so-
called anti-intentionalists have argued that the author's
intentions – plans, aims, and purposes considering her work –
are highly irrelevant to interpretation. In this paper, I shall
argue that the relevance of the actual author's intentions
varies in different approaches to fiction, and suggest that
fictions are legitimately interpreted intentionally as
conversations in a certain kind of reading. My aim is to show
that the so-called conversational approach is valid when
emphasizing the cognitive content of a fiction and truths it
seem to convey, for example, in a philosophical approach to
fictions which contain philosophical purport using Sartre's
fictional works as paradigmatic, and that anti-intentionalists'
arguments against intentionalism do not threaten such an
approach.
Key Words
actual intentionalism, anti-intentionalism, conversation, fiction,
hypothetical intentionalism, intention, interpretation,
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1. Introduction
Appeals to the author's intention in order to legitimate an
interpretation of a work of literary narrative fiction have
generally been considered extraneous in Anglo-American
philosophy of literature since Wimsatt and Beardsley's well-
known manifesto from the 1940s. For over sixty years now so-
called anti-intentionalists have argued that the author's
intentions – plans, aims, and purposes considering her work –
are irrelevant to interpretation. "Actual intentionalists," on
their behalf, have claimed that the author's intentions are
significant and may even determine the meaning of her work.
In the broad anti-intentionalism versus intentionalism debate,
it has become common to compare literary fictions to
everyday conversations to defend one claim or another.
Philosophers I call "aesthetic anti-intentionalists," such as
Beardsley and Dickie, admit that the author's, or speaker's
intentions are, at least to some extent, relevant in interpreting
conversations in which they see a practical need for mutual
agreement on the meaning of an utterance, but irrelevant in
approaching fiction which allows interpretive freedom from its
author because of its artistic nature. On the other side, many
actual intentionalists, most notably Carroll, suggest that
fictions are akin to conversations because of their cultural and
linguistic nature, and thus they are to be interpreted as
conversation from the author to her audience by appealing to
the author's intended meaning.
In this paper, I shall argue that the relevance of the actual
author's intentions varies in different approaches to fiction,
and suggest that fictions are legitimately interpreted
intentionally as conversations in a certain kind of reading. My
aim is to show that the conversational approach[1] is valid
when emphasizing the cognitive content of the work and the
truths it seems to convey, for example, in a philosophical
approach to fictions which contain philosophical purport, such
as Sartre's novels and plays, and that anti-intentionalists
arguments against intentionalism do not threaten such an
approach.
2. Intentions and Intentionalisms
The "intention" that the anti-intentionalists and intentionalists
debate often remains woefully obscure. For Wimsatt and
Beardsley, as it is well known, intention was originally, vaguely
a "design or plan in the author's mind."[2] The threefold
distinction of intention I apply in this paper is based on Michael
Hancher's and Jerrold Levinson's views. Using Levinson's
apparatus for conceptual-economic reasons, there is, first, the
"categorial intention": what sort of work the author wanted to
write, for example, a short story or an essay. Secondly, there
is the "semantic intention": what the author meant by the use
of her words and sentences. Thirdly, there is the intention
missing from Levinson's theory, the Hancherian "final
intention": what the author wanted to do or cause by means of
her work.[3] The intentionalist arguments as they are known
today can be, in turn, distinguished into narrower and broader
versions. The narrower version, E. D. Hirsch's theory, which
Monroe C. Beardsley labelled "The Identity Thesis," claims that
the meaning of a work of fiction is the meaning the author
intended in composing it, whereas the broader version argues
that the fiction writer's intention is relevant to, or in some
sense determines, the meaning of her work.
To begin with, it should be noted that the broader version of
the intentionalist argument, which I argue for, does not hold
that the correct interpretation of a work of fiction would be
completely determined by the actual author. Rather, it holds
that the author's intentions are relevant in interpretation. Noël
Carroll clarifies well the aims of moderate actual intentionalism
(which he calls "modest actual intentionalism"). As Carroll puts
it, for a moderate intentionalist, a correct interpretation of a
work of fiction is the meaning of the text compatible with the
actual author's intention. Moderate actual intentionalism
considers only those intentions important for which the text
can give support. It does not lead to "Humpty-Dumpty-ism,"
in which the author could make her work mean anything just
because she wills it so. Where the text can support several
different interpretations, the correct interpretation is the one
compatible with the text and the actual author's intentions.
Thus, in moderate actual intentionalism the meaning of a work
is constrained by the textual meaning or word sequence
meaning and the best information about the author's intended
meaning, where available. Best information, in turn, consists of
evidence such as the art-historical context of the work,
common beliefs of the contemporary audience, the author's
public biography, her oeuvre, and the like.[4]
The anti-intentionalist's main objection is that the author's
intentions are irrelevant for the interpretation of works of
fiction. For the anti-intentionalist, fictions are autonomous
entities interpreted only by appealing to their semantic
properties; references to the author are claimed to confuse
the work and its origin. However, in philosophical approaches
to fiction, the author's actual intention and our information of
her are highly relevant and desirable in determining the
categorial, semantic, and final meaning of her work. For
instance, it has been often argued that Sartre used his novels
and plays to convey his philosophy, perhaps for an audience
broader than the readers of his philosophical works. On the
other hand, it has been claimed that Borges, while he wrote
philosophically significant works, one of them even applied as
a mainstream thought experiment in the philosophy of art, did
not intend his works to be works of philosophy. In such
categorial debates in which one tries to determine the nature
of a certain work, the author's intentions are relevant. An
intentionalist interpretation of a fiction can solve questions
such as whether the work is an oblique philosophical study
dressed in literary form or a philosophical work of art.
Naturally, both anti-intentionalists and hypothetical
intentionalists allow appeals to the author's categorial
intention – say, whether she meant her work to be an essay or
a short story –, for anti-intentionalists and hypothetical
intentionalists need to recognize the author's actual intention
to compose a literary work as a licence to dismiss her
semantic intentions concerning the work.
Secondly, while the focus of this paper is on final, not
semantic, intentions, the information about the author, such as
the beliefs she has expressed elsewhere in her philosophical
works, for instance, provide strong evidence for determining
her semantic intentions and the textual meaning of her
fictions, and in constructing and clarifying the thematic
concepts, themes, and other "literary aspects" of her works. An
intentionalist interpretation aims at revealing the author's
intended meaning: what is expressed in the work. Again, it
has to be noted that an anti-intentionalist may consider the
author's (declaration of) semantic intentions helpful, but only if
they support the interpretation the anti-intentionalist has
formulated from the textual, or dictionary, meaning of the
work. Nevertheless, moderate actual intentionalism holds that
the semantic meaning of fictional utterances is correctly
understood in the light of the author's intentions.
Thirdly, the Beckettian–Foucauldian question, what does it
matter who is speaking, is different in literary and
philosophical approaches to fiction. When a fiction is
approached from a philosophical point of view, that is, focusing
on its philosophical purport, the author's final intentions
manifested in the work and our information about her are
important in determining what the work conveys or suggests
and which views can be attributed to the author. An
intentionalist approach aims at solving whether she, say,
"only" portrays a character who expresses certain kind of
beliefs or uses the character as a mouthpiece for advancing
claims; which of a fictional character's beliefs and views are
about the fictional world and which are genuinely supported by
the author; how reliable is the narrator, and so on.
3. Achieving Intentions
One of the main reasons for dismissing the actual author's
intentions in interpretation has been that they are considered
hard or impossible to reach. It has been argued that, for
example, in some cases the author of a work is completely
unknown, or that in many cases there is no information of the
author's intentions at all, and still the fictions can be
"understood." Cleanth Brooks, for one, ironically said to have
read Andrew Marvell's poem "Horatian ode," not Marvell's
mind.[5] The strict version of the unavailability argument, "the
metaphysical attack on intentionalism," as Denis Dutton calls
it, advances that "intentions proper" are completely
inaccessible.[6] The so-called metaphysical anti-intentionalist
claims that intentions consist of beliefs and desires, which are
objects of mind, and argues that objects of mind cannot be
discernible in public, for mind is by definition private.[7]
Hence, George Dickie and Kent Wilson go on jeering that even
if there were an explicit statement about the author's
intention, it would not help an intentionalist, because to
understand the declaration the intentionalist would have to
know the author's intended meaning in uttering the
declaration.[8]
As a moderate intentionalist I do not find the metaphysical
attack threatening, for, as I see it, intentions manifest
themselves in works. Even an insistent anti-intentionalist like
Wimsatt has admitted that the author's intention might
somehow "leak into and be displayed in the work." In his
article "Genesis: A Fallacy Revived," Wimsatt explains that
when talking about the intentional fallacy, he and Beardsley
meant to say that "the closest one could ever get to the
artist's intending or meaning mind, outside his work, would
still be short of his effective intention or operative mind as it
appears in the work itself and can be read from the work."[9]
On the other hand, even an insistent intentionalist such as E.
D. Hirsch has admitted in his manifesto of strict actual
intentionalism that there is no direct access to the author's
intentions. What one can do is just use the most plausible
assumption or hypothesis of what the author meant by her
utterance.[10]
Now, moderate actual intentionalism holds that when
encountering an utterance, one tries to determine the
speaker's meaning: what she meant by what she said. The
access to the speaker's meaning is guided by the utterance
meaning; the utterance meaning is a key for one's hypotheses
about the speaker's intended meaning.[11] Or as Stephen
Davies puts it, the speaker's intentions are "successfully and
publicly embodied only through their use."[12] While
intentions proper are inaccessible, the speaker's intention is
usually recoverable from her utterance (including the context
of the utterance and, typically, our information about her).
Besides the argument based on the inaccessibility of intentions
proper, a common line of argument seems to advance the
view that actual intentionalism would like to substitute literary
works of art with the author's declaration of intention. Another
conventional argument advanced against intentionalism says
that the author is far from being a reliable witness for her
work; that she may, for instance, manifest her aims in
different ways in different situations. As Carroll points out,
moderate actual intentionalism does not, however, aim at
trading complete works with the author's "compact
restatements" of her works.[13] Although moderate actual
intentionalism considers the author's statements about her
intention valuable, it regards them with suspicion. Declarations
of intention are not intentions proper but utterances, and
therefore their meaning and reliability is subject to
interpretation, as is the work itself. For a moderate actual
intentionalist, the author's statements are rather useful keys
for hypotheses about the meaning she intended for her work –
when they are compatible with the meaning of the text.
Naturally, there are differences in the reliability between
declarations uttered in different contexts. Declarations of
intention differ from, for instance, Borges's playful interviews
to Rand's serious The Romantic Manifesto. Further, the genres
in which the declarations are made are more or less regulated
by institutions, rule-governed social practices. A rough glance
at two institutions, philosophy and literature with regard to the
author's declaration of her intention clarifies the reliability of
different declarations. Admittedly, the rules of the literary
institution are vaguer than those of philosophy. For instance,
fiction writers, as other artists, play with conventions and often
transgress them. In some instances, the novelists' declarations
could be counted rather as parts of their works than serious
statements about their purposes.
Here, Genette's theory of paratexts is of use. According to
Genette, paratexts, "peritexts" and "epitexts," are devices
which help understanding a literary work. By peritexts Genette
refers to textual material surrounding the work, such as
preface, foreword, the author's notes, and the cover texts.
When speaking of epitexts, Genette denotes more distant
texts, for instance, the author's interviews, letters, diaries, and
manuscripts.[14] Furthermore, as Genette notes, in the
literary institution the actual author does not compose the
paratexts alone. For example, editors who compose book cover
texts, advertisers, and the like partake in constructing the
peritexts. And by taking part in the construction of peritexts,
they easily take part in constructing the "meaning" and
"purpose" of the work. Classifying all the assertions made in
peritexts and epitexts as the actual author's genuine
declarations of intention would be problematic, for the author's
statement about intention might be, say, part of the work or
an artistic performance.
The author's declarations made inside the literary institution
generally help to construct a correct interpretation of her
fictional work. However, it has been argued that sometimes
they may misguide or bewilder the interpreter. An author may,
for instance, intend her work to be ambiguous and encourage
her audience to conflicting interpretations,[15] to not manifest
her thematic intentions,[16] or perhaps to celebrate the death
of the author. She may also make use of artistic role, or
assume different, perhaps even inconsistent personae.[17]
Such instances led Beardsley to argue that when the author's
statements about her work and the appreciators' observations
of it radically conflict, appreciators are eager to turn toward
the work and trust the internal evidence they get from it.[18]
Nevertheless, Beardsley's objection does not really bother a
moderate actual intentionalist. When rejecting the author's
statement about her intention as implausible, e.g. ironic, and
appealing to the semantic properties of a work, one takes the
semantic properties as better evidence of the author's
intention than her statement.[19] Moreover, one should keep
in mind that, because of their "literary nature," authors'
declarations ask for interpretation and judgment. They are not
to be discarded outright as the anti-intentionalist demands,
nor accepted straight away as the strict actual intentionalist
might seek, but assessed critically in relation to the work.
However, there are good reasons for taking certain sort of
declarations as reliable, for instance those uttered by so-called
philosopher-novelists. By the term I mean an admittedly
marginal and very heterogeneous group, writers such as
George Santayana, Ayn Rand, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de
Beauvoir, Umberto Eco, and Iris Murdoch, who are recognized
members of both the institutions of philosophy and literature.
Now, there are institutional bases for formulating the
intuitively accepted and broadly used interpretative practice to
decipher a philosopher's literary fictions in the light of her
philosophical studies into a conversational approach. The
philosopher-novelist's intentions, beliefs and views concerning
the philosophical purport of her fictions are recoverable with an
epistemically respectable degree of warrant from her
declarations and philosophical studies. The reason for this is
that in their discourse, philosophers follow certain dialectic
norms which ensure that their conversation serves its purpose.
Generally, philosophers are assumed to commit themselves to
the truth of the propositions they express, provide reasons for
their claims, to be honest and to believe in what they
assert.[20]
As declarations, philosophical studies also, or especially,
demand interpretation when solving what the author intended.
Nevertheless, while no declaration, not even a testimony, is
necessarily true, there are reasons for taking some
declarations to be more reliable than others. For instance,
because of his institutional status as a philosopher, Sartre's
philosophical studies provide very strong evidence for a
moderate intentionalist approaching his fictions from a
conversational philosophical point of view.[21] There is no
need to stay at hypotheses of the author's aims when there
are clear indications for attributing the intentions to the actual
author.
4. Conversational Approach to Fiction
Rather than a legitimative factor, the institutional assurance is
an indication for a conversational approach. Instead, what
makes the conversational approach legitimate is the
interpreter's aim. Now, it has been often argued that works
such as Sartre's Nausea and Rand's Atlas Shrugged offer at
least two readings: one that treats them as literary works, and
other that emphasizes their philosophical characteristics, say
their views, arguments, and the way the philosophical points
are put forward, conveyed, suggested, or implied. These
readings are made possible because such works are
considered written in both aesthetic (or entertaining) and
philosophical aims in mind: they are intended as philosophical
fiction.
Philosophical approaches to fiction have been objected to in
various ways. Some theorists hold that literary and
philosophical readings exclude each other, some that a
philosophical reading does great injustice to literary works of
art, some that a philosophical approach to fiction is a sort of a
category mistake. A common complaint about philosophical
approaches is that they treat works of fiction "schematically,"
failing to understand the aesthetic or literary qualities of them.
It has been argued that a "merely" philosophical use of literary
works – say, when used as examples in moral philosophy –
does not take them seriously as artworks,[22] and often fails
to see that aesthetic qualities of literary works also have a
philosophical role.[23] The critics have reminded us that even
though works like Nausea and Atlas Shrugged are generally
taken to advance philosophical claims, they are (also) works of
art.
For example, Lamarque and Olsen argue that if a work of
fiction is read "as a piece of moral reasoning," the reader does
not approach it from a "literary stance," and thus the
evaluation of the work will differ from a literary reading.
Lamarque and Olsen criticize theories that accept or exhort the
philosophical reading of fiction for being philosophers' theories
of literature and about the nature of philosophy, not literature.
According to them, philosophical approaches to fiction are not
concerned with literature as a "separate and independent
practice" but rather limit themselves to genres or works which
are thought to provide examples for philosophy. Thus, the
theories do not clarify the "role and function of literature."[24]
Elsewhere, Lamarque objects to the conversational approach
to fiction by claiming that philosophers who "import
extraliterary paradigms, even linguistic ones, as models of
literary interpretation […] are in danger of losing sights of the
specificity of these literary functions."[25]
It should be noted that generally philosophical approaches to
fiction are not philosophical theories of the literary institution
or criticism, but theories of the philosophical function of certain
genres or works of fiction. Moreover, the argument of ignoring
the literary qualities of a fiction actually questions strictly
propositional approaches which violently reduce works of
fiction to the author's assertions, failing to see the relevance
of fictional narrator(s) and the overall design of the work.
However, when a work is taken as a philosophical fiction, an
interpretation concentrating on, say, its argumentative aspects
and the truth conveyed through the work, especially when
there is institutional indication or other reasons for such an
interpretation, a conversational reading is highly appropriate,
relevant, and, as I shall show, even necessary.
The difference between literary and philosophical approaches
is their primary aim and emphasis: the literary interpretation
of, say, Sartre's Nausea is in the first place interested in,
among other things, explicating and appreciating the thematic
content of the work, whereas the conversational philosophical
approach is primarily interested in how Jean-Paul Sartre, by
means of depicting Roquentin's feelings, attitudes, and
thoughts, for example, illustrates the experience of existential
angst. Nonetheless, while a work can be approached primarily
as a literary or philosophical work, emphasizing different
aspects of the work, these readings need not exclude others.
One can, for example, approach a work as a literary work of
art and simultaneously pay attention to the strategies by
which the work conveys philosophical views; one may observe,
say, both the way illustrations convey genuine suggestions on
philosophical issues and approach the illustrations from a
literary viewpoint, paying attention to their literary qualities.
Roughly put, if the readings were exclusive, it would take two
critics to review a philosophical fiction: one who does the
aesthetic job and another who does the philosophical.
Nevertheless, as Carroll puts it, one's aesthetic satisfaction
does not forestall one's "conversational interests" in works of
art.[26] Or as Lamarque himself has later suggested the other
way around, while one can read a work of philosophy from a
literary point of view, giving prominence to, say, structural or
rhetorical aspects of the work, the literary focus on
philosophical narratives does not "preclude or supersede or
make redundant the focus of a philosopher on the text's
arguments, conclusions, validity, and truth."[27] Naturally,
Lamarque's claim can be used vice versa.
Finally, philosophical approaches to fiction have been objected
to by an institutional argument which claims that philosophy
and literature are distinct social practices, and for that reason
works of philosophy and works of fiction allow different criteria
for interpretation and assessment; that fiction should not be
approached from a philosophical point of view at all, for
advancing philosophical views is not its (primary) purpose. I
do not really find such an argument sound. Although
philosophy and literature are different practices, they can be
and often have been conjoined. Plato, Kierkegaard, Sartre, de
Beauvoir, and Rand, to mention a few, used literary fiction as
means for presenting their philosophical views. Their works are
both artworks and philosophical works, and can be approached
from different viewpoints and with different primary interests.
(Sometimes the demarcation line between the two practices is
really vague as in, say, Nietzsche's, Bataille's, and Blanchot's
works.)
Literary fiction is communication. Fictions are linguistic
entities, they consist of words and sentences, and they are
composed for an audience to read. The critical questions are,
first, what sort of communication is fiction, and second, from
whom to whom? Actual intentionalism suggests that art is
human action and artworks artefacts made with an aim in the
author's mind. Moreover, it advances that, as both aesthetic
and linguistic objects, fictions are used to express thoughts
and ideas; that they are consciously made objects the author
has intended her audience to understand. Carroll, for one,
argues for the conversational nature of fiction by claiming that
people do not approach works of art as "codes to be
deciphered" but as actions and "action-products" made by
rational agents who act intentionally.[28]
In turn, anti-intentionalists and hypothetical intentionalists
admit the communicative nature of fiction but they deny the
conversational nature of fiction.[29] Even though many
insistent anti-intentionalists allow intention-appealing in
conversations, for example when encountering misspeaking or
malapropisms, ambiguous instructions, and written manuals
and the like, they strictly reject the relevance of the author's
intention in interpreting fiction. Moreover, they often make an
ontological distinction between the realm of life, say,
conversations and actions, and the realm of art.[30]
While the "aesthetic anti-intentionalists" consider it natural to
appeal to what we know of a person, such as her public
biography, to supply clues or to help in constructing
hypotheses about her intended meaning in everyday discourse,
aesthetic anti-intentionalists take all references to the actual
author as illegitimate evidence for literary interpretation.
Aesthetic anti-intentionalists object to the conversational
approach by claiming that linguistic artworks and
conversations are different in their communicative nature.
Peter Jones, for instance, has argued that conventionally,
when classifying a work as a novel, that is, a literary work of
art, the readers are conceded "a certain degree of freedom in
its interpretation." As Jones sees it, in everyday discourse
there is commonly a practical need for speakers to agree on
the interpretations of utterances, say, "Sir, you really cannot
stop your car at the motorway," whereas in art the practical
agreement is given a low priority.[31]
The debate on the legitimacy of the conversational approach
to fiction derives from the different standpoints from which the
debaters approach the subject. Dickie and Wilson, for example,
are interested in an "aesthetic" reading of literary fiction, and
therefore object to the conversational approach; from an
aesthetic point of view, literary fictions are more than plain
"messages" from the author to the audience; they are works
of art. Carroll, in turn, pays attention to the cognitive function
of fiction, and therefore argues for the conversational
approach; while philosophical fictions are artworks, they are
used in truth-claiming; they are philosophical literature or
literary philosophy. Now, if one accepts that literary fiction is
both art and a medium that may be used in conveying
knowledge, both sides are correct.
I claim that there are different approaches to fiction allow
different criteria for interpretation. As I see it, intentionalism
and interpretive pluralism can be conjoined: there can be both
a true interpretation and several plausible, legitimate, or apt,
interpretations depending on the way a fiction is approached.
Stephen Davies, for one, has suggested that there could be
several legitimate interpretative approaches to works of
fictional literature, and that the "pursuit of truth," or "the
truth-targeting interpretation" could be only one of these. As
Davies sees it, the truth-targeting interpretation would aim at
revealing the author's intentions concerning the meaning of
the work and be assessed in terms of truth, while the other
approaches, for example, a psychoanalytic or a Marxist
interpretation, would be judged for, say, aptness,
appropriateness, and suitability to an audience or theory. In
the truth-targeting approach, the author's intentions would
determine the utterance meaning, and an interpretation of
utterance meaning would be true if it recognized the author's
intentions. Thus, Davies suggests that the truth-targeting
approach to literature would not differ from interpreting
conversation.[32]
However, as Davies also argues, while literary interpretations
are not "unconcerned with truth," the "truth-conditions" for
literature and conversations differ in ways about the
"dissimilar functions" these two have. For him, conversation
aims principally "at the communication of information," and
this is executed only when the participants aim at
understanding what they mean by their utterances. Literature,
in turn, is in Davies's view a "(sophisticated) form of
entertainment not only allowing for but encouraging the
exploration of variants of meaning." Davies suggests that such
a view of literature is appropriate "given that our interest in
literature is typically motivated by purposes somewhat unlike
those giving point to our concern with meaning in ordinary
discourse."[33]
Davies's account clarifies the question of the legitimacy of the
conversational approach. For him, the conversational approach
to literary fiction is doubtful given that the purpose of the
interpreter differs somewhat from the interpreter's concern
with meaning in ordinary discourse. I agree. Literary fiction, as
other arts, allows (at least some) freedom in interpretation.
Nonetheless, there is a type of interpretation in which the
interpreter's purposes do not differ much from the
interpretation of conversation. For instance, the conversational
philosophical approach – like any approach interested in truths
claimed in or suggested by a fiction – is driven by the same
purpose as interpretation of any linguistic communication:
what did the author mean by her utterance. A strict distinction
between different interpretative practices, intentional
conversations and intention-irrelevant fictions, is not
reasonable in, say, a philosophical approach to a fiction. After
all, beside its central aesthetic function, fiction also has other
social functions, such as authors' aim at changing readers'
beliefs.
For the actual intentionalist, the cognitive goal in interpreting
conversations is to figure out what the speaker intends to say.
For example, Carroll, leaning on Grice, suggests that on a
plausible theory of language, the meaning of an utterance is
explicated according to the speaker's intention.[34] Further,
Carroll claims that literary interpretation is "roughly
analogous," or "on a par," with interpretation of everyday
conversation.[35] Similarly, for Robert Stecker, textual works
have meaning similar to "other linguistic utterances," and
reference to the actual author's intentions plays a pertinent
role in determining their meaning.[36]
The legitimacy of a conversational approach to fiction varies in
different interpretations. In the conversational philosophical
approach to fiction, people have, whether explicit or implicit,
interests similar to those they have in interpreting
conversations. Philosophical fictions, such as Sartre's works,
are conversation from, in the end, the actual author to the
actual reader. The cognitive goal in interpreting such works
from a conversational philosophical point of view is to figure
out what the actual author intends to say by her fictional
utterances, such as claims and dialogue exhibited. In the
conversational philosophical approach, one encounters
Daviesian communication of information, for one is interested
in the author's intended philosophical meaning, for example,
what Jean-Paul Sartre is doing by means of depicting
Roquentin's experience. This is not to say that in the
conversational philosophical approach the work is reduced into
a philosophical treatise and assessed by the standards of
philosophy but rather taken as an artwork that is used to
convey philosophical views. Neither does the conversational
philosophical approach dismiss the special ways fiction may
contribute knowledge, such as illustrating issues from different
standpoints.
5. Fiction as Philosophical Conversation
Austinian and Gricean oriented aesthetic anti-intentionalists
have objected to the conversational approach further by
claiming that the author's mode of speaking releases her from
the commitments of "assertive" discourse. They have argued
that literary use of language "aestheticizes" language and thus
obviates the relevance of the author's, here final, intention in
interpretation. The objection is complex, and it can be roughly
divided into three parts: first, that the novelist's mode of
speaking completely disallows the author's genuine assertions
in fiction, second, that even though there are author's
assertions in fiction, it is difficult, or impossible, to say which
utterances belong to the actual author and which to the
narrator or a fictional speaker (or which beliefs belong to the
actual author and which to the implied author), and third, that
there is no epistemic principle for distinguishing the genuine
assertions made by the actual author from those derived by
the reader.
Beardsley, who could roughly be placed among the supporters
of the first version of the argument, has insisted that
illocutionary actions, such as claims exhibited by the author,
are actions of the speaker of the work. Further, Beardsley
argues that the actual author only represents the actions,
while the author of the performances is the speaker, who, as a
fictional entity, does not exist outside the work nor has
intentions outside it.[37] And as the speaker does not have
intentions outside the work, Beardsley claims it is futile to look
for them in the life of the actual author.[38] Aesthetic anti-
intentionalists have found it hard to explain other than
"aesthetic functions" of fictional works because they exclude
references to the actual author. Nonetheless, there cannot be
irony, satire, or parody without reference to actual beliefs and
attitudes; also, by dismissing references to the context of the
work, they have ignored the fact that the same utterance
gains different meanings in different contexts uttered. The
truth is, however, that authors do things with words (of their
characters). Authors make, for instance, ethical, historical,
political, theological, aesthetic, and philosophical points in their
works; they write didactic pieces, satires, and investigations of
different sorts. There are genuine illocutionary actions
embedded in works of fiction, both the author's assertions and
especially assertions conveyed by means of fictional
utterances, illustration, thematic statements, and the work as
a whole. It is, as Carroll puts it, a "commonly known, openly
recognized, and frequently discussed practice in our literary
culture."[39]
Whereas aesthetic anti-intentionalism maintains that the
author's mode of speaking rules out genuine assertions, the
conversational philosophical approach considers them oblique,
indirect, implicative, or suggestive. In the conversational
philosophical approach, a fiction is interpreted in similar way to
fictional utterances, such as "as if" scenarios, in assertive
discourses from everyday conversations to philosophy: paying
attention to the way the fictional utterance is used as means
to an end. As Carroll suggests, the author's mode of speaking
does not exclude a conversational interpretation; rather, it
encourages one, because the author's actual views are often
"implicit" or "implied," and "secured through oblique
techniques," conveyed by implications, allegories,
presuppositions, illustrations, and so on.[40] In the
conversational philosophical approach, one is trying to figure
out why the author has constructed a certain sort of character
and put words in the character's mouth "in terms of the
contribution it makes to the point of the character as an
element in the overall design of the work."[41]
Aside from the historical questions about institutions, Plato's
dialogues work here as a rough analogy. When approaching
them from a philosophical viewpoint, one pays attention to
how the characters – who, while they might have real world
counterparts, are fictionalized – reason their claims, and why,
in some instances, become convinced of Socrates' arguments
in the denouement. Hence, Carroll asks, why take for granted
the philosophical status of the Athenian playwright's works,
fictionalized they are, and yet insist that novelists cannot
attribute utterances to their characters? Further, Carroll asks
that if the illocutionary representations in the Plato–Socrates
case can be legitimately treated intentionalistically, would it
not be justified to treat the Dostoyevsky–Alyosha case
similarly?[42] Here, I want to remind one of the institutional
issues: in Dostoyevsky's case, one has in one's hands
hypotheses of the actual author's, a novelist's, intentions
derived from the work and biographical information such as
diaries whose plausibility and "literary nature" one has to
weigh; in the case of, say, Sartre, a philosopher-novelist, one
has both hypotheses derived from the work and declarations
with an institutionally solid guarantee.
Of course it is also possible that the explicit or implicit
philosophical points made in fictions are "merely" constituents
of fictional characters or the theme of the work, or that the
work expresses some beliefs which cannot be attributed to the
actual author. Jerrold Levinson, for one, argues that the parts
or elements in novels which Carroll calls nonfictional, such as
the philosophy of history in Tolstoy's War and Peace, and
which seem to be put forward by the actual author, must first
be attributed to "an implied speaker" or a (Beardsleyan)
narrator. As Levinson sees it, the "nonfiction" parts are uttered
by the implied speaker, a fictional character who describes her
(fictional) world. For Levinson, these "essayish portions"
cannot logically be attributed to the actual author, for she does
not belong to the fictional world and believe in the fictional
characters and events, as the implied speaker does. Further,
Levinson claims that distinguishing the "narrative and
essayistic portions" of a novel to those that pertain to the
actual author and those that pertain to an implied speaker the
narrator(s) threatens the "artistic integrity" of a work. As
Levinson sees it, such a distinction would make the work
neither fiction nor nonfiction.[43]
Here, I propose a position between Carroll and Levinson. The
conversational philosophical approach does not break the
artistic integrity (Levinson) nor destroy the literary aspects
(Lamarque) of a work of fiction. It does not literally tear a
work into two parts, those that are genuinely asserted by the
author and those that are put forward to make-believe.
"Essayish" parts, for example, are always part of the fictional
story, no matter whether the author asserts or only expresses
the assertions they contain. While the conversational
philosophical approach is interested in the author's beliefs
expressed in the works, and especially the essayish parts
where available, it does not attribute these beliefs and parts to
the actual author only.
Peter Swirski, for one, argues that although Rabelais's first,
i.e. categorial, intention was to write fiction, to tell a story for
the audience to make-believe, one could say that he had also
"assertive intentions" or that he advanced non-fictional ideas,
for example, criticized the church.[44] The literary institution
cannot prevent authors from advancing genuine points in their
works. Rather, the institution determines how the readers are
expected to react to them: to make-believe the propositions
and to attribute the points made in the work in the first place
to the narrator or the fictional speaker in question. While the
first entity, to which the performances, such as utterances, in
fiction are attributed, is fictional, the performances may be "in
the second place" genuine, that is, also supported by the
author. Fictional utterances and assertions conveyed by them
can be applied as the actual author's assertions.
Furthermore, hypothetical intentionalists, who rely on the
methods of actual intentionalism but maintain hypotheses
considering the intentions of the actual or a fictional or a
postulated author, should recall that because constructed
authors are fictional entities, they cannot make claims outside
their world, which is – fictitious.[45] If a fiction is said to
claim, put forward, or suggest something, or to express
beliefs, the claims and beliefs need necessarily to be attributed
to the actual author, taken that there is no reliable authorial
declarations or other evidence which would contradict the
beliefs expressed, for claims, in order to be genuine claims,
need to be put attributed to an human agent.
One should also keep in mind the distinction between the
suggestions or reflections the author has made and the
suggestions the reader has derived from the work. It has been
claimed that there is no epistemic rule for telling when one is
speaking of the author's reflections and when of reflections
one has derived oneself. As literary fictions play with
implication, suggestion, and fictional speakers, the distinction
between said and derived is more vague than in philosophers'
fictional dialogues, for instance. Thus, the question of the
author's genuine assertions is not ontological but
epistemological: how to recognize them from those the reader
has derived herself. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be
a general rule or an epistemological principle which could be
applied when trying to decide, whether some (implicit)
philosophical point belongs to the actual or to an implied
author. Carroll notes that one may have to proceed on a case-
by-case basis, relying "on the results of practical criticism (of a
sort that at least countenances the applicability of
intentionalist hypotheses)."[46]
I agree with Carroll when he argues that it might be better to
accept his proposed modus operandi than to conclude that
because there is no epistemological principle for detecting the
author's assertions straight away, actual authors do not
perform illocutionary acts but only represent them. Moreover,
the fact that an actual intentionalist interpretation may not
always be able to verify its hypotheses about the author's
actual intentions in using fictional utterances is just something
to be accepted. What Plato, Berkeley, and Sartre intended to
convey by their fictional dialogues is a question one has to
find out by appealing to the work, such as the style of the
narrative, and best information about the author, her aims,
and beliefs.
Finally, one may attend an intrinsic philosophical reading of
fiction by paying attention only to, say, the arguments the
characters employ and the views they have. One can infer
philosophical views from a fiction, whether supported by the
author or not. Also, keeping in mind the heterogeneity,
complexity, and aesthetic delicacy of literary fictions, it would
be some sort of a didactic heresy to consider all explicit
philosophical views expressed in fiction as the actual author's
truth-claiming. Nonetheless, it is another thing to say
something about the philosophical signification of a fiction,
say, The Brothers Karamazov, than it is to say what the work
philosophically means or genuinely suggests.[47] If one is
interested in the genuine philosophical meaning of a fiction or
the philosophy conveyed through it, one is interested in the
meaning given and philosophy conveyed by the actual author.
6. Conclusion
Literary and philosophical approaches to fictions allow different
criteria. A conversational approach to fiction is legitimate when
the interpreter aims at solving the nature of a work and
especially the points conveyed by it. However, the fictive
mode of speaking and the literary qualities of philosophical
fictions sometimes make it difficult to distinguish the author's
genuine, often implicit, views from those she intended for her
characters only. The characters of a fiction might be just plain
fictional characters talking just plain fictional talk, not
mouthpieces of the author. For example, Roquentin's strongly
Sartrean existentialism in Nausea might be just Roquentin's
strongly Sartrean existentialism in a certain fictional world.
Nevertheless, as I have argued, if the reader aims at solving
the truths a fiction seems to convey, a conversational
interpretation is not only valid but necessary.
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